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All Balls and No Strikes: The Roberts 
Court’s Anti-Worker Activism 
J. Maria Glover* 
“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody 
plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ballgame 
to see the umpire.” … “And I’ll remember that it’s my job to call balls and 
strikes and not pitch or bat.”1 
For decades, legislatures and courts have created and preserved rights and rem-
edies for vulnerable groups—consumers, employees, victims of mass torts, inves-
tors, and the like. Both branches have extolled the virtues of these substantive rights 
and the private enforcement mechanisms required to effectuate them. However, de-
spite statements like that of Justice Roberts and others that the judiciary is not a 
lawmaking body—indeed, that the judicial institution should take care to exercise 
restraint2—the Roberts Court has engaged in sweeping reform that tends to extin-
guish these substantive rights. 
In 2012, I traced how the Roberts Court paid scant attention to the integral role 
private enforcement plays in various regulatory frameworks in which given sub-
stantive laws operate.3 By reducing or eliminating mechanisms of private enforce-
ment, I argued, entire swaths of substantive law would go woefully under-enforced. 
Since that time, the Roberts Court’s civil justice and procedural jurisprudence—
jurisprudence that has brought about systematic retrenchment of substantive 
                                                          
 *  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. Roberts’s Opening Statement Before Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/politics/politicsspecial/robertss-opening-statement-before-sen-
ate-panel.html. 
 2. “The role of a practicing attorney is to achieve a desirable result for the client in the particular case 
at hand. But a judge can’t think that way. A judge can’t have any agenda. A judge can’t have any pre-
ferred outcome in any particular case and a judge certainly doesn’t have a client. The judge’s only obli-
gation, and it’s a solemn obligation, is to the rule of law. And what that means is that in every single 
case the judge has to do what the law requires.” 
Judge Alito’s Opening Statement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, available at https://www.nytimes.com
/2006/01/09/politics/politicsspecial1/judge-alitos-opening-statement.html. 
“But my decisions have never reflected a judgment about the people before me — only my best judgment 
about the law and the facts at issue in each particular case. For the truth is, a judge who likes every 
outcome he reaches is probably a pretty bad judge, stretching for the policy results he prefers rather than 
those the law compels.” 
Here’s Judge Gorsuch’s Full Opening Statement, NBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2017, available at 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/here-s-judge-gorsuch-s-full-opening-statement-n735961. 
“A good judge must be an umpire—a neutral and impartial arbiter who favors no litigant or policy.” 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s Opening Statement: Full Prepared Remarks and Video, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2018, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/politics/judge-brett-kavanaughs-opening-
statement-full-prepared-remarks.html. 
 3. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2012). 
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rights4—reveals that the Roberts Court is not so much inattentive to the exigencies 
of various regulatory frameworks. Instead, the Roberts Court jurisprudence tends 
to reveal an affirmative deregulatory aim. 
 Far from merely calling balls and strikes, and in opinions involving questions 
as varied as ones about class-action rule interpretation, the permissibility of collec-
tive action waivers in arbitration agreements, the ability to opt out of collective bar-
gaining dues on First Amendment grounds, standing, and others, the Roberts Court 
has achieved sweeping deregulation in the past decade. As has been traced in the 
literature, these deregulatory effects have been particularly pronounced in the area 
of consumer law.5 Moreover, the deregulatory effects for the underlying substantive 
regimes have often been achieved through somewhat indirect, procedural decision-
making, but those effects have been almost as significant as if the Court had simply 
re-written the particular rights-bearing statutes.6  
During October Term 2017, the Court moved beyond consumer law and 
ramped up its efforts to effectuate deregulation of employment law. Whatever pro-
tections workers have enjoyed throughout our nation’s history have been secured in 
large part through private enforcement.7  And to be sure, on their faces, critical 
workplace protection laws like Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”)—both of which rely almost exclusively on private litigation for their ef-
fectuation—remain completely intact.  However, in three critical (but less-block-
buster-than-Masterpiece Cakeshop) cases—Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, Epic Systems v. Lewis, and Encino Motorcars—
the Court in back-to-back 5-4 rulings stripped workers of mechanisms to pursue 
their rights against employers who commit wrongs in the workplace. Both history 
and present experience teach us that the Court’s recent opinions will help eliminate 
the regulatory apparatus for workplace injury, and private employers will enjoy in-
creased ability to essentially rewrite their obligations under substantive law through 
procedural vehicles. 
This essay proceeds as follows: Part A traces the Court’s employment law ju-
risprudence from October Term 2017. Part B discusses the regulatory consequences 
of these opinions and argues that the Court’s opinions this past term reflect political 
commitments that favor and disfavor certain types of claims and claimants. 
                                                          
 4. STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 34 (2017). 
 5. See, e.g.,  Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class 
Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735 (2007); Judith Resnik, 
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of 
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substan-
tive Law, 124 YALE L. J. 3052 (2015). 
 6. As I have discussed in prior work, deregulation through procedural decision-making tends to go 
unnoticed given the significantly lower political salience associated with procedural issues. The Court 
engages in misdirection when it fails to own up to the substantive implications—and motivations—of 
these “procedural” decisions. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015). 
 7. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS 
IN THE U.S. (2010). 
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A. THE SUPREME COURT’S OCTOBER TERM 2017 EMPLOYMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court’s efforts to curtail mechanisms of private enforcement of 
substantive rights have been building for at least a decade now.  The Court has 
introduced heightened pleading requirements,8 restricted the class action device,9 
restricted the reach of state laws through broad pre-emption holdings,10 and encour-
aged the recalibration of remedial schemes through private procedural ordering via 
contract11—just to name a few. As I have argued previously, in certain areas of the 
substantive regulatory landscape, curtailing these mechanisms is not inappropri-
ate.12 The extent to which private enforcement mechanisms ought to be curtailed, 
preserved, or perhaps extended depends in no small part upon the overall regulatory 
apparatus in which various substantive laws operate. Private enforcement mecha-
nisms and the ability to effectuate substantive rights through adjudicative processes 
will range from being critical to perhaps unnecessary depending on the structure of 
a given regulatory set-up. However, the Court’s efforts to restrict private enforce-
ment mechanisms have been broad-sweeping and agnostic to—even at times will-
fully indifferent to—the exigencies of the relevant regulatory apparatus involved. 
The Court’s recent employment law decisions suggest that there is more to this de-
regulatory trend that perceived indifference; instead, deregulation is the desired ob-
jective of the conservative majority, which has often demonstrated a willingness to 
abandon conservative jurisprudential methodology to achieve that objective. 
In three cases, all decided October Term 2017, the Supreme Court effectuated 
a fundamental restructuring of the regulatory apparatus for labor and employment 
law. In the first, Epic Systems, the Court held that a mandatory arbitration provision, 
contained in a contract between an employee and her employer, was enforceable 
against that employee under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), even when that 
provision prohibited the employee from bringing her claims in a class action pro-
ceeding.13 Accordingly, a class action brought in federal court by employees under, 
say, the FLSA and state laws for the underpayment of wages, must be dismissed 
and sent to arbitration as soon as the employer files the inevitable Motion to Compel 
(individualized) Arbitration. In so holding, the Court rejected the employees’ argu-
ment, adopted by the Ninth Circuit below, that the FAA could not be interpreted to 
violate another federal statute, here, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). 
The NLRA guarantees workers various protections, including protection against an 
                                                          
 8. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (heightening the federal pleading stand-
ard for complaints to “plausible,” and not merely “possible” or “conceivable”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009) (clarifying that Twombly’s heightened pleading standard applies to all federal cases). 
 9. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344-45 (“The point of affording parties discre-
tion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the 
type of dispute.... [a]nd the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost and 
increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 
(2013) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow courts to invalidate waivers of class 
action arbitration where the plaintiff’s cost of litigating a statutory claim separately from the class would 
exceed the likely recovery). 
 10. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted California state law permitting the invalidation of arbitration agreements). 
 11. Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 3; see also Jaime 
Dodge, The Limits of Private Procedural Ordering, 97 Va. L. Rev. 723 (2011). 
 12. Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 3. 
 13. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
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employer prohibiting an employee from engaging in “concerted activities for the 
purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.”14  By prohibiting collective proceed-
ings, the mandatory arbitration agreement conflicted with the NLRA’s guarantee of 
employees’ ability to engage in concerted activities free from employer restraints 
in their pursuit of substantive rights under the FLSA.15 
The blow to private enforcement through the FLSA and other workplace-re-
lated rights effectuated by Epic Systems is substantial, yet unsurprising. Epic Sys-
tems is just the latest in a series of decisions in which the Court not only reinforced 
its robust commitment to unfettered freedom of contract16 but also ignored conflicts 
between the FAA—a “procedural” statute17—and the text of other federal statutes, 
like the FLSA, or the Sherman Antitrust Act, that provide substantive rights of ac-
tion. In Epic Systems, by essentially ignoring the text of the FLSA and extending to 
the employment context its robust embrace of private contractual arbitration, re-
gardless of procedural restrictions that impede the effectuation of substantive rights, 
the Court helped close the courthouse doors to another group of litigants—this time, 
wage-and-hour workers, by and impeding their ability to pursue their substantive 
statutory rights.18 
                                                          
 14. 29 U.S.C. s. 157. 
 15. In practice, employee collective actions to protect their NLRA rights by means conceptually sim-
ilar to those employed in Epic Systems have been upheld by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
and the courts for over seventy-five years, a point the dissent noted but which the majority dismissed. 
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1638-39 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg notes 
in her dissent that the NLRB had previously found the following examples, among others, to constitute 
concerted activity protected by the NLRA: employees jointly filing a FLSA suit; FLSA suits brought on 
behalf of a class; employees filing a class libel suit; employees filing a class suit with respect to break 
times; and employees’ class actions about wages. See id. (citing cases). The dissent asserts emphatically 
that, in its haste to reach its result, the majority pays no heed to the fact that the collective bargaining 
protection in Section 7 is substantially the same as these prior cases. 
 16. See Glover, Disappearing Claims, supra note 5. 
 17. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing 
out the canon of statutory interpretation that procedural statutes may not override other substantive fed-
eral statutes). See also J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Transsubstantive” Class Action, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625 (2017); William Eskridge & John Ferejohn Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215, 
1263 (2001) (contending that the Supreme Court has converted the FAA into a super-statutory scheme, 
making it more powerful than other substantive statutes valued more highly by prior court). 
    18. In January of 2019, less than one week before this essay went to print, the Supreme Court decided 
New Prime v. Oliveira, No. 17-340 (Jan. 15, 2019), a relatively narrow employment arbitration case. In 
New Prime, however, the Court shocked lawyers and legal observers alike by siding with a worker over 
a corporation in a case involving the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme 
Court Just Handed a Big, Unanimous Victory to Workers. Wait, What?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2019), avail-
able at: https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/gorsuch-arbitration-labor-new-prime-oliveira.html 
Ian Millhiser, Neil Gorsuch Pens a Devastating Takedown of His Most Important Opinion: Neil Gorsuch 
Dunks on Neil Gorsuch (Jan. 17, 2019), available at https://thinkprogress.org/gorsuch-contradiction-ar-
bitration-cases-896a5e28805d/ (noting that the likelihood of the Court siding with a worker over a cor-
poration in an arbitration case “happens about as often as a unicorn wins the Powerball lottery while 
simultaneously being struck by lightning.”) In contrast with its decision in Epic Systems and its other 
arbitration decisions over the last decade, the Court’s opinion in New Prime hewed strictly to conserva-
tive jurisprudential methodology by homing in on the text and original meaning of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. While the import of this decision remains to be seen, the narrowness of the facts and the holding 
makes this an opinion of somewhat limited impact on the areas of employment and arbitration law. To 
be sure, on the one hand, New Prime seems to stand for the notion that there is an outer limit to how far 
the Court is willing to go in ignoring the text of the Federal Arbitration Act. However, New Prime creates 
uncertainty as to precisely when, and in what contexts, the conservative members of the Court will reach 
that limit; when the conservative members of the Court will hew to conservative jurisprudential meth-
odology—as demonstrated by the adherence to textualism in New Prime—and when they will abandon 
it.  
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In a second decision, Janus, the conservative members of the Court engaged in 
an aggressive interpretation of the right to free speech and expression embodied in 
the First Amendment in order to reduce employee access to collective action, di-
minish employee power at the bargaining table, and advance employer-based eco-
nomic and (de)regulatory policy.  At issue in Janus was the legal framework for 
union fees in Illinois. Under Illinois law, public government employees may union-
ize; moreover, if a majority of those employees vote to be represented by the union, 
that union becomes the exclusive bargaining representative for the employees, even 
those who are not members of the union. Given that exclusive bargaining designa-
tion, Illinois law permits unions to charge “agency fees” to non-members—a per-
centage of member dues—to cover the costs of exclusive representation.19 The Su-
preme Court, in another 5-4 decision, held that the “agency fee” provision of the 
Illinois law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, on the grounds that it 
compelled non-members to support collective activities and expression to which 
they might object.20 The Court’s decision in Janus threatens to hasten the financial 
collapse of unions that provide the benefits of representation to all employees,21 and 
represents another piece in a long campaign by the Court and private advocates to 
restructure employment law—here, not through interpretation of the NLRA,22 but 
through a rather non-conservative and non-restrained interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
The third part of the Court’s trilogy of restructuring employment law this term 
came in Encino Motorcars. The Court in Encino confronted the question of statu-
tory interpretation regarding whether or not automobile dealership employees hold-
ing a particular job title were ineligible for overtime pay.23 Automobile dealers hire 
employees in dozens of job classifications. Under the applicable FLSA statutory 
and regulatory provisions, all except three auto-dealership occupations that are ex-
plicitly exempted by the law—salesmen, mechanics, and partsmen—are covered by 
the statute’s overtime pay requirement for work over 40 hours per week. Congress 
enacted this standard to protect employees from employer exploitation by means of 
low wages and excessive working hours. The controversy in Encino was whether 
those with the job title of “service advisor” were exempted by the law from overtime 
pay. 
                                                          
 19. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. and Mun. Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460-61 (2018). 
 20. Id. 
 21. While the majority may be correct that some proportion of nonmembers desire not to pay dues 
because they find the union’s expressions “objectionable,” the inevitable problem lurking just behind 
the curtain is less one of ideological dissent and more one of free-riding. In other words, it is more likely 
that those wishing not to pay dues would wish not to less out of ideological dissent rather than a tendency 
of people to free-ride off the efforts of others. Of course, a desire to benefit from the efforts of others is 
far from a First Amendment right. 
 22. Indeed, the Court’s decision in Janus is particularly striking when viewed alongside its FAA ju-
risprudence. The Court has interpreted the FAA very aggressively on the grounds that it is so important 
for disputes to be resolved outside of litigation. See supra note 19. Yet the NLRA is also directed toward 
resolving disputes outside of litigation, and as a substantive statute, has a much stronger claim than the 
FAA does to be interpreted in a way that strengthens it. Perhaps the Court might believe that First 
Amendment arguments should trump the NLRA here. The Court, however, has been undeterred in its 
robust interpretation of the FAA despite Constitutional due process and separation of powers arguments 
that have been leveled against such an interpretation. While the analysis in the FAA cases and in Janus 
thus seems in tension, the results are aligned, revealing the deregulatory aims of these decisions: Both 
disable the enforcement of rights by typically underrepresented groups against parties with greater eco-
nomic and bargaining power. 
 23. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2018). 
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 Through a rule it issued in 2011, the Department of Labor interpreted the ex-
emption for salesmen to exclude service advisors, reversing prior practice. Current 
and former service advisors at Encino Motorcars brought an action claiming over-
time pay. The Ninth Circuit, reversing a district court’s dismissal of the suit, ruled 
that service advisors were not covered by the exemptions, thus entitling them to 
overtime pay.24 Among the grounds for its decision, the Ninth Circuit invoked a 
longstanding principle of interpretation in FLSA cases that exemptions must be nar-
rowly construed against the employer.25 The Supreme Court reversed and held that 
the auto dealership employee exemptions extended to service advisors as well. 
More than that, and though unnecessary for its holding, the Court discarded the 
presumption that the FLSA should be construed against employers seeking to add 
exemptions from overtime pay coverage to the statute.26 This canon of statutory 
interpretation of the FLSA, relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, had been applied con-
sistently by courts for over fifty years.27 
The conservative majority not only rejected this longstanding presumption un-
der the FLSA, but they abandoned their commitments to textualism, and, indeed, 
ignored the plain language of the statute order to enlarge the exemption provision 
of the FLSA to a fourth category. Specifically, the FLSA exemption from the over-
time compensation requirement applies to “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic 
primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership.28 
By extending this exemption to also include service providers, the Court added an 
entirely new category of workers to this distinctly enumerated list.29 Prior Supreme 
Court FLSA jurisprudence made clear that “the ‘particularity’ of FLSA exemptions 
‘preclude[s] their enlargement by implication’”30 and that “employees outside the 
Act’s ‘narrow and specific’ exemptions…remain within the Act.”31 Thus, in the 
words of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, the Court thus added “an exemption of its own 
creation.”32 Again, this is a far cry from calling balls and strikes and exhibiting 
judicial restraint; this resembles the judicial activism the conservative members of 
the Court tend to decry.  
All three cases represent a continuing trend by the Court to interpret laws meant 
to protect vulnerable workers from adverse actions by employers in a manner that 
severely limits those rights. All three cases reveal the aggressiveness of the Roberts 
Court’s approach to deregulation—its deregulatory objectives achieved not through 
                                                          
 24. See Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, 845 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2017) rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 
(2018). 
 25. Id. at 935. 
 26. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018). 
 27. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1148 n.7 (2018), (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (remarking that “[i]n a single paragraph, the Court ‘reject[s]’ this longstanding principle as applied 
to the FLSA without even acknowledging that it unsettles more than a half century of our precedent.”). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(10)(A). 
 29. See Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (remarking that had the stat-
utory exemption “covered ‘any salesman or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automo-
biles,’ there could be no argument that service advisors fit within it”). 
 30. Id. at 1147-48 (citing Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607, 617 (1944)). 
 31. Id. at 1148 (citing Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U. S. 497, 517 (1950)). 
 32. Id. at 1148. 
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conservative modes of interpretation, but rather through modes resembling the “ju-
dicial activism” that Roberts and other conservative justices often speak against.33 
In one term, the Roberts Court effectuated a one-two-three-punch against the most 
vulnerable members of the regulatory apparatus for labor and employment law. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S DEREGULATION OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The net effect of the three employment decisions this past term will likely be 
retrenchment of regulation of the regulatory apparatus for the employer-employee 
relationship established by Congress. This is true in large part because the enforce-
ment of federal employment and labor laws has long been entrusted to private liti-
gants;34 without private enforcement, the regulatory apparatus for employment law 
is almost non-existent: In the last decades, a mere two percent of job discrimination 
suits were prosecuted by the federal government; 98 percent of suits were brought 
by private parties.35  Similarly, Congress did not secure compliance with wage-and-
hour standards, reflected in the FLSA, through public regulatory supervision but 
rather through private litigation in the courts.36  This choice plays out in stark relief 
on the ground: The Department of Labor investigates fewer than one percent of 
FLSA-covered employers each year.37   
The Court’s decisions in Epic Systems, Janus, and Encino Motorcars strike a 
significant one-two-three punch at the private regulatory apparatus for labor and 
employment law. In particular, first, Epic Systems strips away any meaningful abil-
ity of many low-wage workers to seek the enforcement of rights under the employ-
ment laws. It does so just as consumer-law cases like AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Con-
cepcion38 and American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant39 did before it, by 
giving employers full permission to include arbitration provisions in employment 
contracts—provisions which prohibit any sort of class or aggregate litigation.40 By 
doing so, employers are able to recalibrate the economics of bringing claims such 
that few individuals can afford to effectuate their substantive rights, regardless of 
the merits of their claims. This result is striking, for at least three reasons. One, it is 
striking in part given the pre-existing power imbalance between employers and, say, 
wage-and-hour employees with FLSA claims. One mechanism intended to help cor-
rect that power imbalance, the class action, has been taken off the table by Epic 
Systems. Even with the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in New Prime v. Oliviera, 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Hands Off Constitutions, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090400700.html (criticiz-
ing conservative justices for engaging in activist constitutional interpretation in order to achieve partic-
ular ends, noting that such interpretive methods are inconsistent with true judicial conservatism). 
 34. See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 4, at 85. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 1150. 
 37. Id. at 1150 n.47. 
 38. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 39. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
 40. In American Express, the agreement between American Express and merchants who accepted its 
cards contained a clause that required all disputes to be resolved through arbitration. See id. at 231. In 
AT&T, the arbitration clause between AT&T and its customers provided that “claims be brought in the 
parties’ ‘individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purposed class or representa-
tive proceeding.’” AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 570 U.S. at 336. 
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that reality remains for all but a small subset of workers41—those who work in 
“commerce,” as narrowly defined in the Court’s prior cases.42 Two, relatedly, it is 
striking given that most employee relationships are governed by contracts of adhe-
sion, in which employees had no say or bargaining power (and while collective 
bargaining agreements provide one arguable exception, Janus suggests that we will 
have few of these in the future). While perhaps striking, neither of those prior ob-
servations are surprising; those concerns have not proven compelling to the con-
servative majority in prior arbitration cases. It is a  third feature of the opinion in 
Epic Systems that is not just striking, but a bit surprising: Epic Systems was decided 
by the conservative members of the Court—Justices who, in January 2019, extolled 
their commitment to textualism in New Prime v. Oliviera. In Epic Systems, how-
ever, these very Justices—and in particular Justice Gorsuch (the opinions’ au-
thor)—ignored the plain text of the FLSA, which expressly provides for collective 
action in the statutory text.43  
Even without class actions, however, many employees have been able to rely 
on unions to represent their interests in a collective way with employers. Janus 
strikes a blow to this enforcement mechanism as well. Public unions play a signifi-
cant role in achieving economic security for workers. Janus will likely result in a 
decline in membership—and therefore funding—of these public-sector unions.  The 
lessons from private-sector unions are instructive here. In the aftermath of Harris 
v. Quinn,44 in which the Court struck down agency fees for private sector unions, 
membership in such unions dwindled. While the private-sector membership rolls 
have slightly risen recently, the overall effect has been to deprive those unions of 
funding. The same is likely to happen with public-sector unions, and the effects will 
be broad-sweeping, given that around half of union members in the United States 
                                                          
    41. Though a bit premature to see the impact—if any—of the decision in New Prime v. Oliviera, some 
preliminary observations: First, given the Court’s longstanding trend in arbitration jurisprudence of en-
forcing arbitration agreements, regardless of their terms, it is almost certainly not the case that New 
Prime constitutes a sea change. If New Prime did constitute a sea change, it would require overruling a 
substantial body of precedent built over the last decade, and there was no indication in New Prime that 
the Court has any intentions along these lines. Second, New Prime is likely a very limited opinion is 
especially true given that the decision affects a small subset of workers—commercial truckers—and will 
thus not likely have a large impact on businesses or their use of arbitration. Third, there are independent 
reasons to explain the “pro-worker” outcome of New Prime. Perhaps chief among these reasons is the 
reality that classifying truckers, many of whom are “independent contractors” as non-employees under 
the Federal Arbitration Act would have had far-reaching effects on the interstate trucking industry more 
broadly, with potentially serious consequences for the transport economy overall. As I have discussed 
in prior work, Chief Justice Roberts and other conservative justices tend to shy away from results that 
would create severe disruptions to the market economy, even if that requires a more “liberal” or “plain-
tiff-friendly” opinion to do so. See J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-Transsusbstantive Class 
Action, supra note 17. To be clear, as a textual matter, New Prime seems undoubtedly correct—and the 
decision was a unanimous one. What is strange about New Prime is not that the textual interpretation 
seems incorrect—it seems quite right; instead, what is strange is that the Court has often ignored statutory 
text to reach pro-business results, including in Epic Systems.  
   42.  See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhardt, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (adopting a very narrow definition of the 
word “commerce” for purposes of defining which laborers are involved in “commerce” and within 
Congressional authority over “commerce”).  
 43. 29 U.S.C. s. 201 et seq. 
 44. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
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are public employees.45 The defunding of these unions, moreover, will have an im-
portant deregulatory impact: Public-sector unions, under the relevant state regimes, 
are the exclusive bargaining agent for the relevant workers with their employers. By 
design, there are no regulatory alternatives (which is one of the reasons why state 
legislatures provided for the payment of agency fees in the first place). The Court 
in Janus does not just weaken an enforcement mechanism for employment and la-
bor law, it weakens the enforcement mechanism for those laws. 
Finally, Encino Motorcars reduces the number of wage-and-hour employees 
with access to overtime claims under the FLSA and opens the door wide to further 
retrenchment of FLSA rights in the future. The FLSA was designed to protect over-
time pay for all but three categories of auto workers; the Court has now expanded 
the number of categories to four.46 While the holding in Encino Motorcars applies 
only to autoworkers, the Court’s analysis in Encino leaves ample room for employ-
ers, unencumbered by the long-standing presumption that exemptions to the FLSA 
be construed narrowly against the employer, to now argue that additional categories 
of workers are exempted from overtime protection under the FLSA. Thus, while the 
initial effect of Encino will be confined to a specific category of automobile work-
ers, the possibility of greater deregulation of labor law has been opened. 
In all three of these cases, the Court’s departure from conservative jurispruden-
tial methodology is on full display. These decisions—all 5-4 and all decided by the 
conservative majority—were not reached through conservative interpretive meth-
odology or (often-cited) conservative commitment to judicial restraint.47 Quite the 
opposite. In other words, the conservative majority cannot claim that its methodo-
logical and jurisprudential commitments dictated these results. It cannot claim that 
these decisions represent the oft-touted conservative approaches to judicial deci-
sion-making. Whatever one’s views of these jurisprudential and interpretive meth-
odologies, the conservative majority’s departure from them suggests a commitment 
to other ends, namely, the Roberts Court’s commitment to deregulation across var-
ious areas of the substantive law. 
For example, the decision in Janus reflects the embrace of what these same 
conservative justices might term “judicial activism,” with rather obvious deregula-
tory objectives.  For starters, Janus rides roughshod over both the long-standing 
expectations and reliance interests of state legislatures as well as stare decisis. 
Twenty-two state legislatures enacted agency-fee legislation to allow unions exclu-
sive representation with employers.48 The Court does not eliminate the exclusive 
representation designation, but it eviscerates its ability to function by jettisoning 
forty-year-old precedent that permitted agency fees to fund the exclusive bargaining 
arrangements. State legislatures had long relied on that precedent to structure their 
regulatory approach to labor relations. The decision is not only a blow to unions, 
then, it is a blow to the entire labor relations structure established by almost half of 
the states in the country. 
                                                          
 45. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release, Union Members Summary (2017) (In 2017, 
7.2 million employees in the public sector belonged to unions; in the private sector, that number was 7.6 
million). 
 46. Supra, note 25. 
 47. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253 (2009) (calling for conservative jurists to adhere to their long-held commitments to judicial 
restraint). 
 48. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2499 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, the decision in Janus represents the latest in a trend by conservative 
justices to weaponize the Constitution in general, and the First Amendment in par-
ticular, to achieve what seem like political aims.49  Putting aside debates about 
whether and to what extent certain rights exist under the Constitution, it has long 
been a principle of conservative constitutional jurisprudence that constitutional 
rights ought not be found under every rock and blade of grass, and that such rights 
ought to be rooted in both the text and history of the Constitution itself.50 In Janus, 
the majority all but ignores the fact that it has long provided leeway for public em-
ployers to curtail the speech of its employees (indeed, a contrary result would crip-
ple employment regulation in the United States).51  Further, the majority in Janus 
all but acknowledges that the First Amendment right not to speak is only possibly 
infringed in the case of agency-fee set-ups. The majority acknowledges that public-
sector unions are not permitted to use agency fees for political speech, but it points 
out that a non-member would have a hard time knowing precisely what his or her 
money went to fund. To illustrate that point, the majority provides a list of public 
union expenses, which includes “salary and benefits,” “office printing, supplies, and 
advertising,” “postage and freight,” “telephone,” and “convention expense,” and 
notes that a non-member would need an audit to figure out precisely where the 
money went.52 Not only are these line items administrative, rather than political, in 
nature, but also, more importantly, the First Amendment right being “infringed,” 
according to the majority, is not one derived directly from the text of the First 
Amendment, but rather a speculative one. Maybe, possibly, the union used the 
agency fees to express views with which the non-member disagreed. That is quite 
a strong read of a First Amendment right—that one’s right to free speech—a right 
the Court has stated time and time again is somewhat limited in the context of public 
employment—”shall not [maybe, possibly] be infringed.” 
The deregulatory motivations in Janus are further revealed by the majority’s 
rejection of arbitration as a possible form of recourse for non-members who wish 
to know with more precision what the union does with their fees.53 Ironically, the 
majority rejects the union’s argument that union-funded arbitration is an avenue by 
which non-members can challenge the union’s spending. Specifically, the majority 
notes how expensive it is to hire attorneys and experts to launch a case.54 This was 
precisely the argument raised by the merchants and rejected by the majority in Ital-
ian Colors; there, the Court found that it was “too darn bad” that merchants with 
otherwise valid antitrust claims would not be able to pursue them in arbitration be-
cause of the costs of attorneys and experts.55 Given this tension, it is hard to escape 
the suspicion that the conservative majority almost always favors some types of 
claims and disfavors others. It is likewise hard to escape the growing suspicion that 
the conservative majority almost always favor the claims either brought by or that 
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (demonstrating that the First 
Amendment is increasingly being used as a deregulatory tool). 
 50. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Hands Off Constitutions, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/04/AR2006090400700.html. 
 51. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of St., Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 52. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2482. 
 53. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2482 (stating that even in arbitration proceedings “objectors must still pay 
for the attorneys and experts needed to mount a serious challenge”). 
 54. See id. (noting that “[t]he attorney’s fees incurred in such a proceeding can be substantial”). 
 55. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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favor corporate entities and disfavor claims by those who would challenge corpo-
rate interests. 
The same can be observed in Epic Systems, which not only builds on a line of 
cases that disregard longstanding precedent regarding the Federal Arbitration Act 
as well as longstanding canons of construction regarding the supremacy of substan-
tive federal statutes over procedural ones, but which also takes the arbitration line 
of cases a step further by holding that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
FAA (not the text of the FAA itself) trumps a substantive federal statute that explic-
itly provides for collective action in the text of the statute.56 Likewise, the interpre-
tation of the FLSA in Encino Motorcars, for example, does not derive from the 
statutory text; if anything, it directly contradicts the clear statutory text.57 In short, 
in all three of these decisions, the bare conservative majority abandons long-stand-
ing principles of restraint and tenets of conservative jurisprudence in what must 
almost unavoidably be seen as results-oriented efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
A judge, according to Justice Alito, “can’t have an agenda.”58 Viewed in that 
light, these cases are troubling. In these decisions, the conservative majority selec-
tively uses and abandons of conservative methodologies and demonstrates an un-
stable commitment to statutory text in order to achieve what looks strikingly like a 
broad deregulatory agenda. Especially in our modern political climate, perhaps such 
commitments to judicial restraint seem quaint. Indeed, some have commented in 
recent years that the Court’s political commitments are rendering it irrelevant.59 The 
reality is anything but. The Court’s political commitments are extraordinarily rele-
vant, especially to corporations seeking increased deregulation without the diffi-
culty of securing legislative intervention. This essay discusses this reality in the 
context of employment law, but the deregulatory agenda has been extended, and 
likely will extend, far beyond employment law. Indeed, amidst homilies about ju-
dicial restraint and independence, the Court is setting itself up as a second legisla-
tive body, its deregulatory aims worrisomely political in nature, but far from irrele-
vant. Litigants already have capitalized on this reality. Elected legislatures of the 
states and nation, elected executives, and the body politic itself will find it increas-
ingly difficult to resist. 
 
                                                          
 56. 29 U.S.C. s. 201 et seq.; Supra note 15; but see New Prime v. Oliveria, No. 17-340 (Jan. 15, 2019) 
(finding that Oliviera was exempt from a forced arbitration agreement because the Federal Arbitration 
Act exempts “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” and applying the narrow definition of “commerce” set forth 
in prior opinions that included truckers). The combined effect of Epic Systems and New Prime, at the 
time of this essay, is to reveal quite plainly the instability of the conservative Justices’ commitment to 
conservative judicial decision-making.  
 57. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortion, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253 (2009) (noting an absence of a commitment to textualism as one of the hallmarks of “conserva-
tive” jurisprudence run afoul of its fundamental rule-of-law commitments). 
   58.  See supra note 2. 
 59. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan, What’s the Point of the Supreme Court?, N.Y.C. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/supreme-court-kavanaugh-partisan.html. 
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